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ABSTRACT 
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria 
(Kreps & Wilson (1982)) for generic signaling games based on 
rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, TI!is 
refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and 
others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a 
characterization of the set of stable equilibria (Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1982)) for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies 
and restrictions on beliefs, Examples are given which di fferentiate 
the predictions of these equilibrium concepts. 
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES* 
by Jeffrey S, Banks and Joel Sobel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates the relationship between Kreps and 
Wilson's (1982) concept of sequential equilibria and Kohlberg and 
Mertens's (1984) concept of stability. It introduces a restriction on 
off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs that refines the set of sequential 
equilibria in signaling· games. We call any sequential equilibria that 
satisfies our restriction on beliefs divine. For generic signaling 
games, every equilibrium contained in a stable component is divine, 
Moreover, the solution concept is restrictive enough to rule out all 
of the equilibria that Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive 
grounds. Thus, divinity provides an independent theoretical 
foundation for discarding non-intuitive equilibria in signaling games. 
We provide a generic example to show that divine equilibria 
may not be contained in any stable component. However, the paper 
presents an explicit characterization of stability in terms of off­
the-equilibrium-path beliefs, That is, an equilibrium of a generic 
signaling game is in a stable component if and only if it can be 
supported as a sequential equilibrium with restricted off-the­
equilibrium-path beliefs, Just as Kreps and Wilson (1982) 
characterize perfect equilibria for generic extensive-form games in 
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terms of sequential equilibrium strategies and beliefs, our result 
characterizes stable outcomes for generic signaling games in terms of 
sequential equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs, The 
characterization may be a useful way to compute stable equilibrium 
outcomes and to evaluate the consequences of using stability to select 
equilibria in extensive-form games. 
Independent of our work, Cho and Kreps (1985) analyze the 
power of stability to select equilibria in signaling games. Their 
results closely parallel our own. They identify restrictions on 
equilibria similar to those embodied by divinity. In addition, they 
also state our characterization result (Theorem 3), Cho (1985) 
extends a restriction identified in Cho and Kreps to obtain a solution 
concept that refines the set of sequential equilibria in general 
extensive-form games. 
Our debt to the existing literature on solution concepts for 
noncooperative games is obvious, Recent work on this topic includes 
papers by Kreps and Wilson (1982), Selten (1975), and McLennan (1985), 
who present refinement concepts for extensive-form games; and Myerson 
(1978), Kalai and Samet (1984), and Kohlberg and Mertens (1984), who 
present refinement concepts for normal-form games. 
II. THE MODEL 
In this paper we analyze the equilibria of signaling games 
with finite action sets. There are two players, a Sender (S) and a 
Receiver (R). The Sender has private information, summarized by his 
type, t, an element of a finite set T. There is a strictly positive 
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probability distribution p(t) on T; p(t), which is common knowledge, 
is the ex ante probability that S's type is t. After S learns his 
type he sends a message m to R; m is an element of a finite set M. In 
response to m, R selects an action a from a finite set A(m); k(m) is 
the cardinality of A(m). S and R have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions u(t,m,a) and v(t,m,a), respectively, 
For fixed T, M, and A(m) for m e M, the utility functions 
u(t,m,a) and v(t,m,a) completely determine the game, Therefore, if 
-
M 
L = [T x J:
1
k(i)J2, where Tis the cardinality of T and Mis the 
cardinality of M, then every element of :mL determines a signaling 
game. We call a property of a signaling game generic if there exists 
D c :mL such that the property holds for all signaling games
determined by d a D and a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero contains 
:mL\D. If a property of a signaling game is generic, then we say it 
holds for generic signaling games. 
For any positive integer k, let Ak = {& = (&(1), • • •  ,&(k)):
k 
&(i) } O V i and f &(i) = 1} be the (k - !)-dimensional simplex. 
f-=1 
We refer to the (T - !)-dimensional simplex most often; to simplify 
notation, we write A instead of A • A signaling rule for S is a 
r 
function 
q: T �A ; 
M 
q(mltl is the probability that S sends the message m, given that his 
type is t. An action rule for R is an element of II Ak(m); msM 
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r(alm) is the probability that R uses the pure strategy a when he 
receives the message m. 
We extend the utility functions u and v to the strategy spaces 
Ak(m) by taking expected values; for all t e T, let 
u(t,m,r( • ) )  = f u(t,m,a) r(alml 
aeir'Cml 
v(t,m,r( ' )) = f v(t,m,a) r(alm). 
aeir'Cml 
Also, for each A a A and m e M let 
BR(A,m) e arg max [ v(t,m,r(m))A(t)
r(m)sAk(m) tsT 
be the best-response correspondence for R. 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium for a signaling game consists of 
signaling rules q(t) for S, action rules r(m) for R, and beliefs 
µ('lml e A for R, such that 
1) V t e T, q(m•lt> > O only if 
u(t,m•,rcm•)) =max u(t,m,r(m)); 
msM 
2) V m e M, r(a
•lml > 0 only if 
max f v(t,m,a)µ(tlml; 
aeA(m) t� 
3) if } q(mlt)p(t) > 0, then 
ttT 
In words, (1) states that q(') maximizes S's expected utility, given 
R's strategy; (2) states that r(') maximizes R's expected utility, 
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given beliefs µ('); and (3) states that R's beliefs given S's strategy 
are rational in the sense that Bayes' Rule determines µ(tlm) whenever 
the probability that S sends m in equilibrium is positive. If 
q(mf t) = 0, for all t s T, then sequential rationality does not 
determine µ(tfm), However, the refinement concept introduced in 
Section 3 restricts the values that these beliefs may take, 
Next, we describe stable equilibria, Our introduction follows 
Kreps (1985), Fix a signaling game; let p = (pR,;S) satisfy
0 < pi < 1, i = R,S, and let q and r be strategies for S and R 
respectively that satisfy q(mf t) > 0, V m e M, V t s T and 
r(afm) > 0, V a  e A(m), V m e  M. A (p,q,r)-perturbation of the 
original game is the signaling game in which, if the players choose 
strategies q and r from the original game, then the outcome is the 
outcome of the original game if the strategy chosen by S is 
refer to (p,q,r) as trembles. Let (q,r) be Nash equilibrium 
strategies for a perturbed game. If q(mf t) > O, we say that a type t 
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Sender voluntarily sends m and we say that R voluntarily uses the 
mixed strategy r(m), 
For a given signaling game, we call a subset C of the set of 
Nash equilibria stable if, for every e > O there exists & > O such 
that every (p,q,r)-perturbation of the original game with 
0 < pi < &, i = R,S has an equilibrium no more than e from the set C, 
Definition. A stable component is a minimal (by set inclusion) stable 
set of equilibria. 
Our analysis depends on several properties.1 
Proposition !· For generic extensive-form games, the set of 
equilibrium probability distributions on endpoints2 is finite and all 
equilibria within a given connected component induce the same 
probability distributions on endpoints. 
Proposition i. Every game has at least one stable component. 
Proposition i. A stable set of equilibria remains so when one deletes 
a strategy that is not a best reply against any equilibrium in the 
set. 
Therefore, in generic signaling games, there exists a stable 
set of equilibria with the property that every equilibrium in the set 
agrees along the equilibrium path; the equilibrium may vary off the 
equilibrium path. A variety of off-the-equilibrium-path responses may 
be needed to guarantee that any perturbation of the game has an 
equilibrium path close to a particular equilibrium path. Therefore, a 
single equilibrium need not be a stable set. However, we use 
Proposition 1 to justify an abuse of terminology, We call an 
equilibrium stable if it agrees with an element of a stable component 
along the equilibrium path. In particular, in generic signaling 
games, if an equilibrium is stable, then every perturbation has an 
equilibrium with payoffs close to the original equilibrium payoffs, 
III. DIVINE EQUILIBRIA
Previous refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept place 
rationality restrictions on zero-probability events. In particular, 
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sequential rationality requires that players respond optimally to some 
consistent assessment of how the game has been played. These 
equilibrium concepts do not require a player to draw any conclusion 
when a zero-probability event takes place. That is, although the 
refinement concepts embodied in sequential rationality and perfectness 
require that equilibria of games induce equilibria on any continuation 
of the game, these concepts do not require that a player 
systematically draw an inference from an opponent's unexpected move. 
Nevertheless, in order to decide how to respond to an unexpected 
signal, R should evaluate the willingness of S-types to deviate from 
equilibrium, and then incorporate into his beliefs the information 
that deviations from equilibrium might reveal. 
This section presents an equilibrium concept that refines the 
set of sequential equilibria in signaling games by placing 
restrictions on off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. We begin by 
describing two restrictions on beliefs along with the intuition behind 
them, and then proceed to define an equilibrium concept that 
incorporates these restrictions, 
The first intuitive restriction on beliefs that we discuss 
requires R's off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs to place positive 
probability only on those Sender types who might not lose from a 
defection. Formally, this condition requires that if 
J = {t: u•(t) > u(t,m,r(m)) for all r(m) e BR(A,m)}, 
• 3 ( then r (m) e BR(AT\J'm). Cho and Kreps 1985) also identify this 
condition and show that if an equilibrium is stable, then the 
condition must hold. 4• Our refinement notion includes this type of
restriction on beliefs. 
Figure 15 describes a special case of a sequential settlement
game (see Salant (1984) or Sobel (1985)). There are two types of S 
(the "defendant") : type t2 defendants are negligent: type t1 
defendants are not negligent. S offers a low settlement, m1, or a 
high settlement, m2• R (the "plaintiff") either accepts Ca1) or 
rejects Ca2) the offer. If R accepts S's offer, S pays R an amount
that depends only on the offer. If R rejects the offer, S must pay 
court costs and a transfer depending only on his type (e. g. the court 
finds out with certainty whether or not S was negligent). If 
p(t1) = p(t2) = t• then the game depicted in Figure 1 has two types of
equilibria. 
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-6,0 -6,0 
-11,5 t2 -5,5 -11,5 
Figure 1 
In one type of equilibrium, both types of S offer m1, and R accepts 
any offer; q(m11ti) = 1, i = 1,2, r(a11mj) = 1, j = 1,2. In the other 
type of equilibrium, both types of S offer m2 and R accepts m2 and 
rejects m1; q(m1lti) = 0, i = 1,2, r(a1lm1) = 0, rCa1lm2) 1. In 
order to support this behavior, we need µ(t11m1) � t• We claim that 
the second equilibrium is not plausible because, in order to support 
it, R must believe that t2 is more likely than t1 to offer m1• 
However, t1 prefers to defect whenever t2 does (and not conversely: 
consider an equal mixture of a1 and a2 given m1). Thus, a reasonable 
restriction on beliefs would require that the relative probability of 
t1 should increase if R observes m1• Our refinement notion captures 
this argument as well. 
Fix an equilibrium in which a Sender of type t obtains utility 
u•(t), and, for all t e T, the probability that t sends m is zero. We 
intend to restrict the beliefs that R can have given the message m. 
Since we deal with only one unsent message at a time, for notational 
convenience we drop the argument m from R's response function. 
Recall that Ak(m) consists of all actions, r, available to R 
given m. Let 
• {r e Ak(m): u(t,m,r) Lu (t), for some t e T}
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be the set of actions that some S-type weakly prefers to equilibrium 
actions, conditional on sending m. Our initial restriction is that R 
should believe that any type who sends m instead of the equilibrium 
signal does not expect to lose by doing so. 6 Thus, if R receives the
signal m (as a defection from equilibrium), he should believe that S 
expects him to take an action in AG, 
For all r s  Ak(m)' let 
if u(t,m,r) > u•(t) 
if u(t,m,r) = u•(t) 
if u(t,m,r) < u•(t)
be the frequency that t e T would send m if he believes that m would 
induce the action r and t had a choice between sending m or obtaining 
u•(t). Next, let
rCr) = {r e A: 3 µ(t) e µ(t,r) and c > 0 such that
r<t> = cµ(t)p(t), \It s TJ. 
Notice that r(r) is nonempty if and only if r a AG' If it is common 
knowledge that m induces r, then the posterior probability 
distribution over T must be an element of r(r). Thus, r(r) is the set 
of beliefs consistent with R taking the action r in response to m (and 
t earning u•(t) otherwise).
Finally, let 
convex hull[ u rcr>J· reA 
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Thus, if A is closed, then f(A) is a closed, convex subset of the 
simplex A, and is empty if and only if AG n A is empty. Since 
f(Ak(m)) is empty only if u
•(t) > u(t,m,r), \/ t e T, \/re Ak(m)' R 
truly would be surprised by a defection from equilibrium, and there 
seems to be no reason to select one inference over another in response 
to m. Indeed, in this case, S!JY conjecture supports the equilibrium, 
When AG# d, and hence f(Ak(m)) # d, we think that it is not plausible 
for R to hold beliefs outside of f(Ak(m)) given the signal m. If R 
observes a defection from the equilibrium path, then he must form a 
conjecture over T baaed on that defection. 
Notice that any equilibrium in which beliefs lie in f(Ak(m)) 
satisfies the intuitive restrictions that we described earlier. All 
conjectures in f(Ak(m)> assign zero probability to any t e T with 
• u(t,m,r) < u (t), \/re �(m)' Furthermore, if there exists t,t' e T 
such that µ(t,r) = 1 implies µ(t' ,r) = 1, \/ r e Ak(m), then for all
beliefs in f(Ak(m)), the ratio of the probability of t' given m to the
.lill...'..l probability of t given m is at least as great as p(t) • That is, R 
believes that t' is at least as likely to defect as t. 
Beliefs must lie in f(Ak(m)) provided two conditions hold. 
First, R believes that no type t would use m if t expected R to take 
an action that resulted in utility leas than u•(t). Thia means that S 
expects R to take actions in AG given the signal m. Second, S-typea 
have a common conjecture over the distribution of actions that R would 
take as a response to a defection. Thia second condition may seem odd, 
since there is only one Sender. However, a "type" is a specification 
of the information S has concerning decision parameters that are not 
common knowledge. Thus, it is possible for two S-types to have 
different conjectures over R's actions in equilibrium. If it is 
common knowledge that R holds beliefs in f(Ak(m)), then S should 
expect m to induce an action in BR(f(Ak(m)),m). Thia observation 
suggests the following iterative procedure. Let 
A, and for n > O, 
r, . {
if f<An-l) # d 
if f(An-l) = d 
A r r• r n • BR( n'm), = n n' n 
A• = n An • n 
Others use iterative procedures in the definition of 
equilibrium concepts. Specifically, given the assumptions that S 
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expects R to take actions in AG given an unexpected signal m and that 
S-typea have a common conjecture over the actions that R would take in 
response to m, our iterative procedure coincides with that used by 
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) to define the set of rationalizable 
equilibria. 
Theorem 1. In generic signaling games, if an equilibrium in which 
q(m(t) = 0 \/ t e T is stable, then there exists r• e A• such that 
u(t,m,r•) � u •(t), \/ t e T.
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Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 3. It states 
that if an equilibrium is stable, then there exist beliefs in r• that 
support it. We discuss the proof later in this section. 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium in a signaling game is divine if 
it is supported by beliefs in r•. 
Thus, by Theorem 1, every stable component contains a divine 
equilibrium. Therefore, Proposition 2 implies our next result. 7 
Theorem i. Every signaling game has a divine equilibrium. 
We believe that divinity captures a minimal restriction on 
off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. Stability implies much more, but we 
are not convinced that these restrictions are plausible. 
The set of beliefs in r• depend on the prior distribution of 
Sender types. To check this property, one need only note that in the 
game that Figure 1 describes, 
for the equilibrium in which both t1 and t2 send m2 with probability 
one. Let r•• be the intersection of the r• taken over all 
nondegenerate priors on Sender types. We can show that in generic 
signaling games, if an equilibrium is stable, then it can be supported 
by beliefs in r••. Call an equilibrium supported by beliefs in r•• 
universally divine, To see that universal divinity is more 
restrictive than divinity alone, note that in Figure 1, the sequential 
equilibrium in which S sends m2 with probability one is divine 
2 provided that p(t1) � S' but it is never universally divine since, 
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regardless of the prior probability that S is t1, R must believe that 
8 the unexpected signal m1 comes from t1• 
Cho and Kreps use Proposition 3 to further refine the 
equilibrium set. For a fixed equilibrium outcome and unsent signal m, 
call a type t bad for m if, for every equilibrium giving rise to this 
outcome, a t-Sender strictly prefers the equilibrium outcome to 
sending m. 9 Proposition 3 implies that a stable equilibrium can be 
supported by beliefs that give no weight to any type that is bad for m 
(if all types are bad for m, then the equilibrum payoffs strictly 
dominate any payoff S can obtain from a best response to m). To see 
that this condition is more restrictive than universal divinity, note 
that for generic signaling games, if t is not bad for m, then e(t), 
the element of A with t-th component equal to one, is an element of 
r••.lO Thus, Proposition 3 also implies that in generic signaling 
games, if an equilibrium is stable, then there exist beliefs in r••
that support it. 
•• • 
Since r, c r, Theorem 1 follows from Proposition 3. 
IV. A CHARACTERIZATION OF STABLE EQUILIBRIA 
This section gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
sequential equilibrium in a generic signaling game to be stable. 
First, we present an example of a signaling game that has an unstable, 
divine equilibrium. The example motivates the notion of stable 
beliefs that we need to prove our equivalence theorem. 
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Consider the signaling game in Figure 3, 
ml a m2 al a2 a3 a4 
tl 0,0 tl -1,3 -1,2 1,0 -1,-2 
t2 0,0 t2 -1 -2 I . 
1,0 1,2 -2,3 
Figure 3 
Let p(t1) = t· There exists a sequential equilibrium to this game in
which q(m11ti) = 1, i = 1,2, r(a1lm2) = 1 
supported by beliefs µ(t11m2) 2 f· This equilibrium is universally 
divine since 
� = r•• = A and
a1 e BR(�,m2); also, neither t1 nor t2 is bad for m2 so that the
Proposition 3 does not restrict beliefs. However, this equilibrium is 
not stable. 
The stable equilibrium for this example involves both t1 and 
t2 sending m2 with probability one and R responding to m2 with actions 
a2 and a3 with probability t each. 
Now we argue that the equilibrium in which S does not use m2 
is not stable, Notice that if S voluntarily sends m2 an equilibrium 
to the perturbed game in which S types expect to receive 0, then R 
must either use an equal mixture of a1 and a2 or an equal mixture of 
a3 and a4 in response to mz· Hence, R must believe that the 
probability of t1 given m2 is equal to either f or t• Any other 
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strategy for R leads to positive payoffs for at least one S type or 
negative payoffs to both, Moreover, when R mixes equally between a1 
and a2, t1 does not voluntarily send m2 and when R mixes equally 
between a3 and a4, t2 does not voluntarily send m2• This argument 
establishes that if µ(t11m2), the probability of t1 given m2 if S does 
1 2) not voluntarily send m2, is an element of <3•3 , then there is an
equilibrium to the perturbed game close to the original equilibrium 
only if the tremble induces R to take an action given m2 that does not 
1 2 attract either type of S, Moreover, if µ(t11m2) i <3•3> .  then the 
perturbed game has an equilibrium that is close to the original game 
and in which either t1 or t2 voluntarily sends m2• Therefore, the 
equilibrium in the example is stable if and only if, given m2, every 
best response to the set of beliefs in which the probability of t1 
1 2 given m2 is an element of <3•3) leads to nonpositive expected payoffs
1 2 to both S types. Since a3 e BR((3.3l,m2) yields positive payoffs to 
both S types, the equilibrium is not stable. We apply an analogous 
argument in general signaling games. First, we identify the set of 
trembles that cannot induce voluntary action in any equilibrium to the 
perturbed game that is close to the original equilibrium. Second, we 
prove that an equilibrium is stable precisely when no best response to 
this set of trembles induces S to voluntarily send m. 
As in the previous section, fix an equilibrium that leads to 
utility levels u•(t), V t e T, and in which q(mlt> = O, V t e T. For 
each J c T, define 
and, 
I(J) - {r e Ak(m): u
•(t) 1 u(t,m,r) I,/ t e T, and 
u•(t) u(t,m,r) if and only if 
for r e  I(J), define 
�(J,r) s {A s int A: � A 
such that A
• 
• 
s A with r s  BR(A•,m) 
£:: a(t)e(t) + JlA, for 
teJ 
a(t) 2 0, 1 - £:: a(t) a fl > 0}, 
teJ 
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t e J}, 
where e(t) s A is the vector with t-th component equal to one and all 
other components equal to zero. Finally, let 
A<Jl s 
{
n �(J,r) 
reI(J) 
A 
n A<J>. 
JCT 
if I(J) f. d 
if I(J) = q 
Consider a perturbed game in which trembles induce a belief A given m 
unless some type voluntarily uses m. For sufficiently small trembles, 
there exists an equilibrium to the perturbed game, with payoffs close 
to u
•
(t), in which R takes action r given m if and only if A� �(J,r) 
for some J; the action r is not a best response to any beliefs 
obtained by "adding" combinations of t e J to A if and only if 
A e �(J,r). As only S-types in J voluntarily use m in an equilibrium 
in which they could obtain u
•
(t) by not sending m, �(J,r) contains 
exactly the beliefs that may cause instability if R takes action r 
given m. Thus, n A(J) is the set of trembles that cannot induce 
J-1'<Jc:r 
voluntary action in any equilibrium. However, A(d) are those beliefs 
18 
which give rise to actions attractive to some S types. This argument 
leads to our characterization theorem. 
Theorem 1. In generic signaling games, an equilibrium is stable if 
and only if, for all unused signals m, A* = Q, 
V. EXTENSIONS 
While we confine our discussion in this paper to signaling 
games, Propositions 1-3 hold for generic extensive-form games. Since 
these results combine to imply Theorems 1 and 2, we can use our 
techniques to rule out implausible sequential equilibria in more 
general extensive-form games. We suspect that divinity is easier to 
verify than stability and may be simpler to generalize to games with 
infinite strategy spaces. On the other hand, Theorem 3 and possible 
generalizations appear to be valuable only as a characterization of 
stable equilibria. 
We conclude by noting that our techniques do not refine the 
set of sequential equilibria in signaling games in which signals are 
costless. Specifically, let A(m), u(t,m,a), and v(t,m,a) be 
independent of m. These games are not generic, so we cannot apply our 
results directly. However, it is easy to verify that r• = A for any 
unused signal. This is because if t induces the action a e A with 
signal m', then there exist beliefs for which a is a best response to 
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the (unused) signal m. When signaling is costless, t is indifferent 
between sending m and m' and no other agent strictly prefers m to his 
equilibrium payoff. In addition, straightforward arguments show that 
stability does not restrict the set of equilibria, although this kind 
of game always has an equilibrium in which all types of S send the 
same signal and typically has other, more appealing, equilibria. 
Farre1111 (1984) and Myerson (1983) present ideas that apply to 
costless signaling games. Myerson presents an axiomatic solution that 
limits the outcomes in a mechanism-design problem that usually has a 
large number of sequential equilibria, but it is not clear that his 
ideas extend in a sensible way to a noncooperative framework, Farrell 
argues that an equilibrium outcome is not plausible if there exists an 
unused signal m, a nonempty set J, and an action r e BR(A,m) such that 
J = {t: u*(t) < u(t,m,r)}, where 
A(t) 
[ :'"'[ .. . , p(t') if t e J 
if t � J 
is the conditional probability of t given t e J. That is, Farrell 
argues that R should interpret a defection that benefits exactly the 
set J as evidence that exactly those t in J use m. Farrell calls an 
equilibrium in which this type of defection does not exist neologism 
proof. Neologism-proof equilibria do not exist in general, and, in 
games with costly signaling, need not be divine. 
2 0  
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1. Kreps and Wilson (1982) prove Proposition 1. Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1984) prove Porpositions 1-3. 
2. An equilibrium induces a probability distribution on the endpoints 
of the tree. An equilibrium probability distribution on endpoints 
is a probability distribution on endpoints induced by some 
equilibrium. 
3, If J = T, then no action R can take in response to the signal m 
induces S to send m. In this case, any beliefs are permissable. 
4. Kreps (1985) suggests a less restrictive version of this 
condition. Kreps discards an equilibrium in which there exists a 
sender type who would like to defect for every action in 
BR(AT\J'm). 
5. We represent examples with a bi-matrix B(m) for each m e M, There 
is one column in B(m) for each strategy in A(m) and one row for 
each type. The entry in the t-th row and the a-th column is 
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(u(t,m,a), v(t,m,a)). In each of these examples, the qualitative 
properties that we discuss in the text remain valid if we perturb 
the entries in B(m). 
6. It does not change our results to require that R believes that any 
type who sends m instead of the equilibrium signal expects to 
benefit strictly by doing so. Thus, we can use a strong 
inequality in the definition of AG. 
7. Strictly speaking, Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 imply the existence 
of divine equilibria in generic signaling games. A limiting 
argument, based on the upper hemi-continuity of divine equilibrium 
paths, establishes Theorem 2. Cho (1985) gives the details of a 
related argument. 
8. Harris and Raviv (1983) study a game in which there is a divine 
equilibrium that is not universally divine, hence not stable. 
Their comparative-statics analysis concentrates on the stable 
path. 
9. McLennan (1985) defines a refinement concept that is similar in 
spirit to this requirement. Specifically, call an action useless 
if it has a suboptimal payoff in every sequential equilibrium of a 
game (not just those equilibria in a stable component). McLennan 
shows that there exist sequential equilibria with beliefs 
restricted so that, at each information set, they assign positive 
probability only to nodes reached by the fewest useless actions. 
From this, McLennan recursively defines higher-order uselessness 
and arrives at a set of justifiable equilibria. In generic 
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signaling games, only strongly dominated actions are useless, thus 
any divine equilibrium is justifiable. 
10. This condition is strictly more restrictive than universal 
11. 
divinity. In the game described in Figure 2, there is a 
sequential equilibrium in which both S types send m1 with 
probability one and R takes a3 given m2. It is straightforward to 
check that f'*• = A, However, the message m2 is bad for t2• When 
R believes only t1 would send m2, R's best response given m2 is 
a1, Therefore, the equilibrium is not stable. 
ml a m2 al a2 a3 a4 
tl 0,0 tl -1.3 1,2 -1,0 .1.-2 
t2 0,0 t2 1,-2 1,0 -2,2 -1,3 
Figure 2 
Grossman and Perry's (1984) concept of perfect sequential 
equilibria is similar to Farrell's concept, However, Grossman and 
Perry analyze a particular game with costly signaling. 
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